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Fiscal balances have deteriorated quickly in recent years, bringing back to the foreground the 
question what factors help explain such sharp changes. This paper takes a broad perspective at the 
issue regarding countries included, the range of explanatory variables tried, and the time-span. 
The empirical analysis shows that changes in budget balances are affected by debt growth, 
macroeconomic developments and political factors. In particular, we find that the run-up to EMU 
induced additional consolidation in Europe and that budget balances deteriorate markedly in 
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December 2004Non-technical summary 
Government accounts in many OECD countries have deteriorated rapidly in the early 2000s. In 
Europe, government deficits on average have risen sharply and have exceeded the 3% of GDP 
reference value of the Maastricht Treaty in many countries. In the US, a discussion on 
consequences of vanishing public debt due to large government surpluses at the end of the 1990s 
was put on hold as sizeable deficits on government balances rapidly emerged.  
 
Such events bring to the foreground the issue what factors causes such changes in government 
balances. Relevant questions in this context are: How strongly do changes in the macroeconomic 
environment affect government balances? Do general elections affect governments’ incentives to 
stimulate the economy? Do large swings in asset and housing markets have an effect on 
government balances? Do different types of government (left-wing or right-wing) have different 
fiscal attitudes?  
 
More insight into the causes of changes in fiscal balances improves the understanding of the 
budgetary processes. This may help in selecting tools to avoid the occurrence of unsustainably 
large government deficits and debts. The outcomes of the study can also help in forming 
expectations about future budgetary developments. Such insight is of particular importance in 
Europe given the EU fiscal framework aimed at avoiding excessive government deficits. 
 
This paper takes a broad perspective at the causes of changes in government deficits regarding the 
countries considered, the time-span covered, and the potential range of explanatory variables 
included in the empirical approach. We focus on OECD countries as far as data availability 
allows, leaving 22 countries. However, we separately pay attention to the sample of 15 European 
countries given the EU fiscal rules under the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, estimations for a sub-
set of countries provide information on the robustness of the results. The time-period covered is 
1970-2002, thus also including the 1970s when many countries faced rapid fiscal deteriorations. 
On the basis of an overview of the relevant literature, a wide range of potentially explanatory 
variables has been selected, relating to budgetary, macroeconomic and political developments.  
 
The empirical analysis is based on pooled Least Squares. In addition, White-heteroscedasticity-
consistent and Seemingly Unrelated regressions estimates were also included to tackle possible 
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December 2004The empirical outcomes suggest that changes in fiscal balances are shaped by the fiscal starting 
cycle, EMU-entry and asset price developments. The positive relation between budget changes and
last year’s debt ratio points to a self-correcting mechanism: large fiscal debts are corrected in the
period thereafter, and vice versa, though the size of the effect is rather limited. Macroeconomic
developments affect budgets via automatic stabilisers and fine-tuning policies. Fiscal policies 
have not operated symmetrically over the business cycle: governments have been more prone to 
stimulate economies in downswings via expanding budgets than to restrict economic growth in 
upswings via tightening budget balances. An increase in the long-term interest rate increases 
budget deficits by about 0.15% of GDP in the year thereafter, but the effect is less important in 
more recent years. Election years are also clearly reflected in larger budget deficits, reflecting 
political business cycles. For the EU countries, approaching the year in which the decision was 
made on early EMU participation (1998) spurred fiscal consolidation, but the data do not reveal 
any lasting effect of EMU on budgetary behaviour. Asset market prices (stock markets and 
housing prices) also affect budgetary outcomes, even though their effect normally is limited and 
mostly relevant in the more recent years.  
 
Specifically with regard to the European countries, these findings imply that when setting safety 
margins below the 3% of GDP ceiling of the Maastricht Treaty, taking into account more factors 
than simply the macroeconomic sensitivity of budgets is a necessity. If not, there is an increased 




Working Paper Series No. 422
December 2004
position (last year’s change in the debt ratio), macroeconomic conditions, interest rates, the election
Maastricht Treaty increases.   
1.  Introduction 
 
Budgetary balances deteriorated substantially in the early 2000s, both in Europe and in the US. 
Deficits in many European countries, including the large countries Germany and France, have 
surpassed the 3% of GDP reference value that the Maastricht Treaty contains for government 
deficits. Across the Atlantic, budgetary discussions in the US in the second half of the 1990s 
focused on consequences of a very low or even a disappearing government debt. Now, the US 
again faces significant deficits, 3.7% of GDP in 2002. After several years of steady improvements 
in public finances, these adverse developments provide a reminder of how quickly fiscal balances 
can deteriorate. 
 
Such events call for more insight in the factors that result in changes in fiscal balances. This study 
may contribute to signalling upcoming changes at an early stage, and to finding remedies 
especially to prevent or limit very sharp changes. We do not find other studies in this area fully 
satisfactory in terms of their time coverage, the span of countries involved, and/or the 
specification of dependent and explanatory variables. 
 
The main aim of our paper is to identify the main factors causing changes in fiscal balances. We 
do this for the set of OECD countries as far as data availability allows. However, given the fiscal 
deficit limits that apply now in the EU, we also separately consider the EU sample. Section 2 first 
describes the background for this study in more detail, while section 3 provides a history of fiscal 
developments in the OECD sample. After describing the various factors that may result in 
changes in fiscal balances and our research strategy (section 4), we present the results (section 5). 
The final section of the paper (section 6) contains conclusions. 
 
 
2  Motivation 
 
The motivation for this study first of all stems from a positive analysis of public finances: what 
factors contribute to changes in budget balances? To what extent do the changes in the 
macroeconomic environment affect fiscal outcomes? Is there a political business cycle? Is there a 
built-in correction mechanism in public finances, with governments responsive to increasing debt 
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light on the importance of various factors by adopting a broad approach. 
The questions above receive special attention in the European Union, with avoidance of excessive 
deficit being an entry condition to EMU, and remaining a requirement after adoption of the euro. 
Compliance with budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of reference values for the general 
government deficit ratio (3% of GDP) and for the gross debt ratio (60% of GDP). In case of 
continued non-compliance, a number of consecutive steps can be taken, which ultimately could 
lead to the imposition of fines. In addition, the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact requires countries 
to respect a medium-term budgetary position objective of close to balance or in surplus. Such a 
position allows countries to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations, while avoiding that the 
government deficit goes above the 3% of GDP reference value for the deficit. Apart from cyclical 
variations, there are other sources of budget volatility that need to be taken into account to reduce 
the risk of excessive deficits. In 2001, the ECOFIN Council endorsed the Content and Format of 
 
“…has to take account of several elements, such as the possibility to deal with adverse 
cyclical developments and other unforeseen risks whilst respecting the government deficit 
reference value, the need to take account of other sources of variability and uncertainty in 
budgets, and the need to ensure a rapid decline in high debt ratios.” 
 
This study tries to contribute to identifying factors that cause additional volatility and may result 
in sharp changes in the government budget balance. 
 
While focussing on causes of changes in budget balances, it has to be recognised that changes in 
deficits themselves may have economic consequences. There is a vast volume of theoretical and 
empirical economic literature focussing on the consequences of deficits and debts on 
macroeconomic variables including interest rates, exchange rates, inflation, savings, employment 
and economic growth.
2 On the latter, for instance, it can be argued that budgetary volatility makes 
it more difficult for economic agents to discover the underlying course of public finances. Agents 
may not fully and directly distinguish incidental and cyclical factors causing sharp changes in 
budget balances from permanent shifts in fiscal policies. Uncertainty may lead them to postpone 
decisions with longer-term consequences such as investment, thus potentially contributing to 
lower economic growth in the medium and long term. 
                                                           
1 Countries within the EU submit annual stability programmes (euro area countries) or convergence 
programmes (non-euro area EU countries), specifying their medium-term budgetary targets. 
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1 Stability and Convergence Programmes , which states that a medium-term budgetary position 
2 
Tax-smoothing models (e.g. Barro (1979)) provide a theoretical rationale for varying budget 
deficits. The theory suggests that temporary expenditure shocks can be fully reflected in deficits, 
thereby avoiding distortionary costs associated with tax rate variations. However, the observed 
cross-country-variation in fiscal behaviour, and fast increasing debt ratios in the 1970s and 1980s, 
cannot be reconciled with this theory (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997)). Thus, this theory 
does not seem to explain changes in government fiscal positions. 
 
 
3  The stylised facts: three decades of fiscal ups and downs 
 
The geographical focus in this study is the OECD area, as far as data availability allows, with 
special attention paid to the 15 countries formally constituting EU. The sample starts in 1970, 
thus including the economic recession of the early 1970s and its effects on government balances. 
The sample ends in 2002, capturing some recent fiscal deteriorations. In addition, for the EU 
countries it includes years in the run-up to EMU, as well as the first experiences with EMU. Data 
refer to general government fiscal balances. 
 
Chart 1 shows the average general government deficit in the period covered for the three major 
currency areas. It shows euro area and US deficits moving broadly in parallel until 1994, after 
which US deficits lead euro area developments. In both monetary areas, 2001 saw a reversal of 
fiscal improvements that had started around the middle of the 1990s. In Japan, developments 
were broadly in line with those in the two other major currency areas until 1980. After that, 
movements were contrary, with Japan reaching a record deficit of more than 10% of GDP in 
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The degree of budgetary volatility has been very diverse across countries. As an illustration for 
that, chart 2 depicts the largest surplus and the largest deficit recorded over 1970-2002 per 
country, with countries ranked according to the difference between these two. 
 
 
Chart 2. Maximum and minimum budget balances per country, 1970-2002 (as a percentage 
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With differences being marked, three other observations are worth mentioning. First, on average, 
larger countries exhibit smaller dispersion in budget balances. This probably reflects the fact that 
these countries are less sensitive to economic shocks because of their size and their economies 
being less dependent on the exports sector, translating into smaller cyclical fluctuations in 
budgets. In addition, the budgetary sensitivity in the larger countries usually is somewhat smaller 
than in the smaller ones, since the share of government sector in the whole economy is inversely 
related to the country’s size. Secondly, stability-oriented countries like Austria and Switzerland 
also have a low score on the fiscal dispersion index. Results did not change much when using 
standard deviations instead of the high-low differences. Finally, larger dispersion on average is 
related to larger deficits, and less to larger surpluses. While only few countries have observed 
surpluses over 5% of GDP, the large majority of countries experienced deficits above 5% of GDP 
in at least one year in the period observed. 
 
Additional information on fiscal policies in the period 1970-2002 stems from considering changes 
in fiscal outcomes. Charts 3 and 4 below give some additional insight in the time- and cross 
sectional distribution of large fiscal changes. In particular, we focus on deteriorations, which 
often take place quicker than budgetary improvements. A large fiscal deterioration is defined as a 
worsening in the government budget balance that amounts to at least 2% of GDP during one year. 
In chart 3, the vertical axis measures the number of large fiscal deteriorations in the period 1970-
2002, while in chart 4 the number of countries experiencing a large fiscal deterioration in a 
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Portugal and Sweden stand out as countries with deficits deteriorating relatively often by 2% of 
GDP or more on an annual basis, whereas Spain and the Netherlands only experienced one such 
episode over the last three decades. The time profile in chart 4 shows a sharp fiscal deterioration 
in 14 of the 22 sample countries in 1975. Other years/periods in which many countries suffered 
from large budgetary setbacks were 1982, 1992-1994, and 2002. This underlines the usefulness of 
including the early 1970s in our sample, adding many interesting cases, while also showing the 
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4  Factors causing changes in fiscal balances 
 
The analysis of budget deficits is all but a new topic. Increasing budget deficits and debts after the 
first oil crisis boosted economic research into the causes of budgetary changes. Initially, emphasis 
in such studies was on economic and fiscal factors explaining observed budgetary trends. Later, 
attention shifted to explaining cross-country variations as common economic circumstances 
coincided with divergences in countries' fiscal behaviour. Behavioural effects were taken into 
account, with particular attention paid to political-economy aspects, more or less starting with 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a). Political aspects included fragmentation, measured e.g. by the 
number of spending ministers or the number of political parties in government. Also the political 
orientation of the cabinet has been taken into account (e.g. Carlsen (1997)). The political business 
cycle has been used as explanation of budget increases around election dates. The role of direct 
democracy (referendums) has been included as well (Feld (2002)). Also features of the budgetary 
process were examined in analysing differences in fiscal outcomes; Alesina and Perotti (1999) 
highlighted the role of budgetary procedures, while Hallerberg and Von Hagen (1999) 
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(e.g. Gleich (2003)) and developing countries (e.g. Woo (2003)). 
 
While providing useful information on the determinants of changing budgetary positions, 
previous studies on this topic do not fully meet our demands. Many of them are not recent, thus 
not including the creation of EMU in the countries of the European Union, and the period of 
deteriorating deficits around and after the turn of the century. Furthermore, the specification of 
both dependent and independent variables often leaves much to be improved upon, with many 
studies focussing on one or a limited number of the explanatory variables only. While often 
looking at political-economy aspects, other factors, such as asset price developments, tend to be 
ignored. Our approach to measuring factors resulting to changes in fiscal balances is as follows. 
 
A. Choice of dependent variable 
 
A first choice in the analysis concerns the budgetary variable to concentrate on. A wide variety of 
fiscal measures is available, including deficits and debts, and nominal or cyclically adjusted data. 
• 
• 
                                                          
The debt ratio, either net or gross, has been used on the basis that it is a broader measure of 
government activities than the deficit (e.g. De Haan and Sturm (1997)). However, 
governments usually define their annual budgetary targets in flow terms (deficits) rather than 
in stock terms (debt). This is partly because stock variables are harder to target as factors 
outside direct government control (for instance economic growth, exchange rate changes and 
asset price changes) affect stock variables more than flow variables. Thus, this study will 
focus on deficit data rather than debt data. 
Instead of nominal budget data, some studies concentrate on cyclically adjusted data (e.g. 
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002)), sometimes excluding net interest payments. Correcting 
deficits for the effects of the business cycle in principle gives a better measure of the policy-
related part of the budget, and reduces the simultaneity bias that may arise as budgets and 
economic growth interact. However, there are serious caveats in estimating cyclically 
adjusted balances, notably defining trend/potential output. Interest payments can be taken out 
so as to distinguish between the automatic effects of interest rate changes on budgets and the 
fiscal policy reaction to that. 
 
 Roubini and Sachs (1989b) in particular argue for using net debt on economic grounds. De Haan and 
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3•  Another question concerns the use of central versus general government data. The former has 
been advocated on the ground that fiscal changes usually originate from this part of the 
government sector (Volkerink and De Haan (2001)). General government, however, has a 
wider coverage, and non-central government sectors in some countries play a major role in 
budgetary activities. Moreover, the general government is the relevant concept in the context 
of the EU fiscal policy framework. 
 
Taking into account the above considerations, as well as data availability, we will use nominal 
general government budget balance as the dependent variable in our analysis. 
 
B. Independent variables 
 
As to the factors explaining changes in budgetary outcomes, one can distinguish budgetary, 




-  Change in debt ratio. The debt-to-GDP ratio captures concerns on the sustainability of fiscal 
policy. On that account, increasing debt ratios should lead to an improvement in the budget 
balance. It could therefore be expected to enter the equation with a positive sign. The change 
in the debt ratio may however show up with a negative sign in the estimations. A higher debt 
ratio automatically causes a rise in interest payments, resulting in a worsening of the fiscal 
balance, which is our dependent variable. 
 
On the specification of the debt variable, a quadratic formulation has been suggested (Melitz 
(2000)) revealing that higher debt levels induce more stabilising fiscal reactions. Another 
suggestion has been to use interest rate-growth adjusted debt ratios (Roubini and Sachs 
(1989a)). This adjustment reflects the fact that government debt ratios may not give rise to 
sustainability concerns if output growth exceeds the real interest rate. 
 
-  Lagged budget balance. Lagged budget changes could be introduced in the estimation 
equations on account of corrections to past budgetary imbalances. Large changes in budget 
deficits in the past may induce governments to undo part of the past increase. Changes in 
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public finances in the following years as well. However, lagged dependent variables are 
known to produce inconsistent estimates. Considering that changes in the debt ratios already 
will be included, we decided to exclude the lagged changes in the budget balance as a right-




-  Unemployment rate/output growth/output gap. These variables measure the fiscal 
responsiveness to macroeconomic conditions. They operate mainly through automatic 
stabilisers, via tax revenues and unemployment-related expenditures. An additional effect 
could arise from discretionary fine-tuning efforts. Anti-cyclical policies aim at stabilising 
economic growth around potential. In a recession, this calls for additional deficits, while in a 
boom a contractionary budget helps dampening cyclical upswings and avoiding overheating 
of economies. 
 
Literature points to possible asymmetries in fiscal responses to recessions and upturns (e.g. 
Mayes and Viren (2000)). In recessions, governments pursue expansionary policies to combat 
the downturn, but in economic upswings the cyclical budgetary proceeds are used for cutting 
taxes or increasing spending rather than for additional consolidation. 
 
-  Long-term interest rate. A high interest rate worsens the overall budget balance via 
increasing interest expenditure on newly issued debt and on rolling debt. On the other hand, 
higher interest rates signal higher opportunity costs of bond market financing, possibly urging 
governments to improve the fiscal balance. Overall, however, the first effect is expected to 
dominate, thus producing a negative correlation between interest rates and budget balances. 
An alternative measure could be interest expenditures as a percentage of GDP, on the ground 
that effects of high interest rates on fiscal policies depend on the prevailing debt level (e.g. 
Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002)). However, it would 
enter then in the estimation equation being part of an accounting identity. 
 
-  Inflation. Inflation often is included among the variables affecting the budget balance. It may 
have an automatic effect on government receipts and expenditures through nominal 
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assuming governments to adjust policies in case of inflation, for instance because high 
inflation erodes competitiveness and risks causing pressures on fixed exchange rates for 
countries participating in an exchange rate agreement (Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999)). It 
may also result in an increase in long-term interest rates and thus have a negative effect on 
investment and economic growth. On the other hand, governments might also welcome 
inflation as it erodes the real value of nominal government debt. Thus, the overall effect of 
inflation on budget balances is not a priori clear. 
 
-  Short-term interest rate. In setting fiscal policy, the monetary policy stance may be an 
argument. The expected reaction, however, is ambiguous. High short-term interest rates to 
reduce inflationary pressures could be supported by fiscal policy or it could be countered, 
depending on policy preferences, views on the operation of the economy, and the allocation 
of tasks among policymakers. Modelling monetary policy by an interest rate, moreover, may 
capture other elements such as cost of government financing, as described above when 
discussing long-term interest rates. This may be of particular importance in case of 
predominantly short-term financing or in case there is a strong link between short-term and 
long-term interest rates. 
 
-  Asset prices. Experiences in a few Nordic countries in the early nineties demonstrated that 
equity and house prices may significantly affect government budgets. Asset price effects on 
the budget may occur via the following channels;  
¾  Directly via budgetary items. In particular, one can think of capital gains taxes and 
wealth-induced changes in consumption tax revenues. 
¾  Indirectly, via second-round effects of asset prices on the economy, for instance lower 
consumer tax revenues due to lower consumer confidence and private consumption when 
asset prices decline. 
¾  Via the fiscal costs of a budgetary bailout of financial institutions in trouble. 
 
-  Welfare level. Real GDP per capita is a potential explanatory variable, under the assumption 
that low welfare levels lead to higher deficits for financing catching-up expenditures (Woo 
                                                           
 Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2002) provide a more detailed description of the channels of impact of asset 
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4
 4(2003)). Although our sample is restricted to developed countries, possibly the economically 




Many studies on causes of fiscal changes focus on cross-country differences in political 
institutions. The general idea is that certain political aspects increase the likelihood of major 
changes in the fiscal policy course and the occurrence or persistence of high deficits. Political 
factors increasing the deficit bias include the area of political instability (e.g. frequency of 
elections), political orientation (e.g. left-wing versus right-wing government), and the budgetary 
process (e.g. the competencies of the minister of finance). In specific, this study considers the 
following political variables. 
-  Election year, to detect electoral fiscal cycles as suggested by the literature on political 
business cycles. Upcoming elections may cause politicians to spend more and tax less to 
increase the likelihood of being re-elected. 
-  Government composition index (left-right wing parties in cabinet). It has been suggested that 
left-wing political parties are more expenditure- and deficit-prone than right wing parties (e.g. 
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999)). In addition, left-wing governments may implement larger 
anti-cyclical programmes in recessions but also undertake more consolidation during 
upswings (Carlsen (1997)). 
-  Type of government (from single party government to temporary caretaker government). A 
single party government is believed to be more decisive than multiparty majority 
governments, let alone minority governments and caretakers, reducing the need for higher 
deficits as grease for the coalition. 
-  Fiscal governance. This variable measures whether major budgetary powers have been 
allocated to the Finance Minister ("delegation"), whether the role of the Minister of Finance 
is merely to enforce the pre-existing contract between spending ministers ("commitment"), or 
whether spending decisions are more or less made in isolation from other ministers 
("fiefdom"). A final possibility is a mixture delegation and commitment ("mixed"). The 
typology is based on Hallerberg (2004). 
-  Number of political parties. The effective number of parties in parliament may affect the 
fiscal orientation as a high number of parties indicates a need for coalition governments, 
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political institutions in a country. The higher the quality, the lower are the expected deficits. 
 
Dummy variables 
-  The run-up to EMU may have resulted in additional consolidation measures in European 
countries to qualify as early participants in the European monetary union. Compliance with 
the convergence criteria on debt and deficit was a necessary requirement to adopt the euro. It 
is not evident that the effect is a lasting one.   
-  Country- and year dummies were also considered. Country-specific dummies for instance 
relate to the German unification (1990) and to financial rescue support for troubled banks in 
Finland and Sweden (1991-1993) and in Japan (1998). Year dummies have been included to 
capture cross-country related macroeconomic shocks that are not fully reflected in the 
macroeconomic variables included in the estimated equation, e.g. oil price shocks in the 
1970s, the first Iraq war and the ERM crisis in the early 1990s, and the September 11
th 
terrorist attacks and the second Iraq war in 2001/2002 As emphasised in Kontopoulos and 
Perotti (1999), not taking year-dummies into account may severely distort the results. 
 
 
5  Estimation equation, estimation technique, and results 
 
The data range included in the estimations is 1970-2002. Including the 1970s is considered 
fruitful, as it was a period with rapid fiscal deteriorations in nearly all countries included, 
providing a good opportunity to test which factors cause changes in fiscal balances. Including the 
most recent period in the sample not only includes another episode of quickly deteriorating fiscal 
balances, but also allows some preliminary testing on changed fiscal attitudes in European 
countries just before and after EMU. 
 
In our approach, we will focus on the nominal general government budget balance, as pointed out 
earlier. Main arguments for this choice relate to data availability and the fact that governments 
often monitor it (or a similar concept) or even target it. This argument also favours using nominal 
                                                           
 Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) argue that EMU may well have strengthened the deficit bias. They point 
out that, contrary to the pre-EMU period, expansionary fiscal policies in one euro area country are no 
longer counteracted by exchange rate developments because of the adoption of the single currency. Interest 
rate reactions will also be smaller than before as short-term ECB interest rates set are based on euro area 
average conditions, and long-term interest rates are less responsive to national fiscal developments owing 
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5instead of cyclically adjusted balances, which is reinforced by the caveats in distinguishing trend 
and cyclical developments. In addition, it is the relevant concept in the EU-context as European 
fiscal rules refer to the nominal general government net lending/net borrowing. Some drawbacks 
of the approach adopted here, however, also deserve attention. Taking the deficit in one year as 
dependent variable implies that transitory effects are included as well, for instance resulting from 
one-off transactions that were reversed in the following year(s). Furthermore, using nominal 
balances does not allow making a distinction between automatic effects of the economy on the 
budget and discretionary policy reactions causing changes in budgetary outcomes that arise if the 
government reacts systematically to changes in the macroeconomic environment. 
 
Estimates are based on pooled Least Squares. The estimation period is 1970-2002, but shorter for 
some countries and for some explanatory variables reflecting data availability. Altogether 713 
observations were used for 22 countries. Budget balances have been corrected for UMTS 
receipts, which were particularly large in a few European countries in 2000. In addition, all series 
have been corrected for data-breaks to arrive at consistent series. Our focus is on changes in 
budget balance rather than fiscal balance levels, to arrive at stationary series. All estimations 
include fixed-country effects, to account for country-specific characteristics not captured by other 
explanatory variables. Coefficient values, not shown in the table, were close to zero in all 
countries. Sources and descriptions of the data used are included in annex 1. Annex 2 includes the 
results of the unit root tests for the main variables to be used in the empirical analysis, revealing 
satisfactory outcomes. 
 
5.1  Results for OECD countries 
 
In first instance, regressions were run for all OECD countries for which data were available for 
the key variables identified in section 4, being: the former 15 EU countries, USA, Japan, 




-  Changes in the government debt in the previous year give rise to a correction in the budget 
balance. It produces a statistically significant but small positive coefficient (0.04): countries 
with fast increases in debt ratios undertake slightly more consolidation efforts to improve 
budget deficits. An alternative specification, the change in the growth-interest rate differential 
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gross debt, and lower statistical reliability of net debt data, we preferred to use the gross debt 
data. Statistically significant results were obtained using the difference between the country's 
debt ratio and the average debt ratio over the countries included in our sample but coefficients 
did not markedly differ from the ones reported above, reflecting that in many countries the 
debt ratio has consistently been above or below the average. 
 
-  Real GDP growth has a positive impact on budgets, as expected, the income elasticity of the 
budget being 0.15.  Using changes in the unemployment rate and output gap gave rather 
similar results as when using changes in GDP.  In view of the relatively high correlation 
between real GDP growth and the change in the unemployment rate (-0.5 across all 
countries), we did not include both in the estimated equation but only used GDP growth. 
The changes in the output gap were not used in the final equation specifications because of 
the problems and uncertainties related to their computation.   
 
The income elasticity reported is rather low compared to standard income elasticities of 
budget deficits: the OECD (Van den Noord (2000)) reports income elasticities around 0.5 for 
the average of European countries  and somewhat lower values for most non-European 
countries, like in the US (0.25), Japan (0.26) and Australia (0.28). Melitz (2000), in an 
overview of the literature on income elasticities, concludes that values around 0.25 are not 
uncommon in empirical estimates. Viren (2000) studies income elasticities using various 
approaches (single equations, VAR-models, and structural macro economic model 
simulations) and also concludes values in the order of 0.2-0.3 for EU countries. 
 
A number of factors can help explain the relatively low value of our income elasticity 
compared to standard income elasticities. For one, the year dummies included mostly pertain 
to years with negative economic shocks, thus likely picking up some income effect. In 
addition, whereas standard coefficients only include automatic effects, the coefficients in our 
estimation may also reflect pro-cyclical fiscal policies: governments using cyclical proceeds 
                                                           
 As explained later in the main text, the reported elasticity is the elasticity applying in economic upswings 
as we include a dummy variable in the equation measuring the elasticity in downswings. 
 Trend GDP growth has been estimated using a HP-filter with lambda value of 100. 
doubts about studies including both of them as independent variables (Roubini and Sachs (1989a), (1989b), 
Hallerberg and Von Hagen (1999), Carlsen (1997)). 














The correlation between real GDP growth and the change in the unemployment rate may raise some in upturns for additional spending, while in a recession the deterioration in the deficit is 
counteracted by consolidation measures. The Commission (2001) and Hallerberg and Strauch 
(2002) indeed conclude pro-cyclical policies for the last three decades, at least for the EU.  
Feedback effects, reflecting effects of budget changes on national income, can also not be 
excluded. 
 
-  Asymmetrical fiscal responses to a positive and a negative output gap (change) were also 
tested. Two additional dummy variables were included in the estimated equation, a first one 
taking value 1 in case of a negative output gap, a second one taking value 1 when the output 
gap declines. While the second dummy variable produced no good statistical results, the 
interaction of the dummy for the output gap level with GDP growth produced satisfactory 
results at the 10% significance level when lagging the dummy by one year. This is 
denominated “GAP” in the tables. The negative value (-0.06) indicates that in recessions the 
income elasticity of the budget balance is lower than in upswings. This lower responsiveness 
of budgets to a 1% increase in GDP may reflect more expansionary policies in or just after 
economic downswings, causing slower revenue growth or higher expenditure growth than 
would be expected if the fiscal stance were neutral. The asymmetric response is in line with 
Viren (2000) but contrasts Wyplosz (2002) who considers Italy, France and the US. 
 
-  Interest rates.  The one-year lagged change in nominal long-term interest rates has a negative 
effect on budget balances. A 1% increase in the interest rate results in a deterioration in the 
government budget balance in the order of 0.14% of GDP. The obtained results seem fairly 
plausible in the light of the prevailing government debt levels and the debt structures. They 
are also broadly in line with the rule of thumb computations and, for the European countries, 
with the estimates provided in the stability and convergence programmes regarding the 
interest rates sensitivity of fiscal balances. As we use overall budget balances as dependent 
variable and not the primary balance, we are not able to distinguish between an automatic 
effect of interest rates on budgets and any discretionary government response to higher 
borrowing costs. Inclusion of the real long-term interest rate, with and without inclusion of a 
consumer price index, did not produce satisfactory results. 
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10
 If this explanation holds, the coefficient on the interaction variable of the recession-dummy and real GDP 
10-  Lagged changes in stock market prices are positively related to budgetary balances, though 
the effect is small (0.004).  Results using current stock market prices were statistically not 
significant. The lagged effect may reflect delayed private sector responses to changes in 
wealth as well as tax collection lags. The size of the effect does not appear unrealistic, taking 
into account generally low effective tax rates on capital gains, their low share in total 
government tax revenue and also low propensities to consume out of wealth. 
 
-  Fiscal balances on average deteriorate by about 0.3% of GDP in general elections years.  If 
elections are related to the business cycle, e.g. because budgetary cuts in difficult economic 
times are politically harder to implement, the coefficient would also capture part of the effect 
of macro-economic conditions on the budget. Furthermore, as far as budgets are ‘not 
managed’ because of the changeover to a new government, the coefficient not only measures 
deliberate fiscal expansions to gain electoral support, but also the lack of parliamentary 
backing for government reactions in case of adverse macroeconomic or budgetary 
developments. In addition, it could reflect strategic attempts of an outgoing government to 
limit the room for manoeuvre for a new government with another ideology (Beetsma and 
Bovenberg (1999)). 
 
-  Effects of EMU-entry are evident for the EU countries in the sample. The results show a 
0.8% of GDP additional annual improvement in budget balances over the period from 1994 to 
1998. The significant effect is in line with the findings of Volkerink and De Haan (2001). 
Von Hagen et al. (2002) conclude that main effects were only present in the first half of the 
1990s, mentioning that large consolidation in the later years of the 1990s reflects other 
determinants of budget balances. Busemeyer (2004) reported EMU-effects for 1992-1997. 
Extending our EMU-variable to include years after 1998 did not produce statistically 
significant results. This could confirm the general notion that consolidation efforts 
accelerated in many EU countries with the prospect of an early EMU-entry but not on a 
permanent basis.  
 
                                                           
 This compares to an elasticity value as high as 0.85-0.95 in Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002). 
 Buti and Van den Noord (2003) and Clark and Hallerberg (2001) provide evidence that the political 










other years are included in specific year-dummies.  
business cycle has not disappeared in Europe after the start of EMU. 
12
13-  Country-specific dummies reflecting bank bailout costs in Finland, Sweden (1991-1993) and 
Japan (1998) also proved significant (not shown in the tables). While bailout costs typically 
are related to fierce asset price developments, and thus could be reflected in the asset price 
coefficients, the emergence of financial problems of a corporation or financial institution 
usually follows a boom-bust pattern that is difficult to include in macroeconomic variables. 
We found no significant effect for a German unification dummy.  
 
-  Significant year-dummies were included in the estimation equation for the years 1974, 1975, 
1976, 1978, 1981, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 2002 (not shown in the tables). To improve the 
comparability of the results, these year-dummies were kept the same in all subsequent 
estimation equations. 
 
While the above arguments contributed to explaining changes in budget balances in our sample of 
OECD countries, a few others did not. 
 
As to other political variables, the variable measuring the type of government sometimes 
produced significant effects, but with a counter-intuitive sign. Theory suggests that caretaker 
governments are less decisive than single party governments because of lack of parliamentary 
support. Our empirical results, however, indicate otherwise, which is why it has been excluded.  
Other political variables included did not deliver significant results. This relates to the Schmidt-
index of the cabinet composition, assuming left-wing parties to be more deficit-prone than right-
wing parties. Lack of empirical support for this suggestion is not uncommon, as e.g. in Alesina, 
Roubini and Cohen (1997).  They explain the result by pointing out that left-wing governments 
may be more prone to increase both expenditure and taxes, leaving deficit positions relatively 
unaffected. Equally, the number of parties in parliament was included, as well as Henisz’ political 
stability measure and variables measuring the fiscal governance type
significant results. 
 
                                                           
 The negative effect of German unification on public finances in Germany was most likely captured by 
the ERM crisis related common macroeconomic shock dummy in the beginning of 1990s.  
 Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) argue that the case for single-party governments to be stronger is not 
clear-cut. Furthermore, they point to classification difficulties, and also suggest that effects on expenditures 
may be more likely than effects on budget balances. 














countries were available. 
 In Volkerink and De Haan (2001), government ideology only matters in the 1970s. 
17Short-term interest rates did not have a significant effect on budget balances. This interest rate is 
a limited indicator for monetary policy, as it also reflects financing costs for short-term debt. 
Furthermore, effects may be more indirect, running from monetary policy via macroeconomic 
developments to the budget, via automatic effects. One study finding a significant effect of short-
term interest rates on fiscal balances is Melitz (2000). He reports macroeconomic policies moving 
in opposite directions; a tight monetary policy induces a loose fiscal policy, and vice versa. 
 
Inflation did not prove to have a significant effect on budgets. One reason for this could be 
differences in indexation mechanisms in the sample of countries. In some countries, there is no 
full and immediate indexing of tax brackets for inflation, causing tax revenues to rise with 
inflation. In such countries, tax schemes are usually adjusted on an ad hoc basis, broadly 
following price developments but not immediate and one-to-one. On the other hand, a number of 
countries link government expenditures explicitly to inflation, e.g. when targeting real 
expenditure growth, causing expenditures to increase directly and proportionally with the 
inflation rate. Viren (1998) indeed reports both positive and negative significant coefficients for 
inflation on the fiscal balance in a sample of OECD countries. 
 
Real GDP per capita did not enter the equation satisfactorily. Possibly, income differences within 
our country-sample were not large enough to detect such an effect. Alternatively, at least for the 
European countries, EU capital transfers to countries with large physical investment programmes 
may leave the overall national budgetary effect too small to detect. 
 
Result robustness: testing for sub-periods and using alternative estimation techniques 
Table 1 also shows the estimation outcomes when splitting the sample in two: 1970-1986 
(column 3) and 1987-2002 (column 4). Apart from allowing detecting changes over time, such a 
split can be justified by a change in economic paradigm around the middle of the 1980s. The 
disadvantages of Keynesian-inspired fine-tuning policies became more evident, and concerns 
about sustainability received priority with mounting government debt. Thus, the mid-1980s 
represents the period in which deficits peaked in many countries, and started falling thereafter. 
The exact timing of this change however differs markedly across countries. 
 
Comparing results across the two sub-samples, it is clear that results are more robust for the 
recent period than for the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. The debt coefficient increases, 
from 0.03 to 0.08, reflecting increasing concerns on debt sustainability given high debt ratios and 
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and the size of automatic stabilisers in most countries or the move to a more counter-cyclical (or 
less pro-cyclical) policy over time, as observed by Gali and Perotti (2003) though their 
observation is not undisputed. Interest rates are the main exception to the observation that the 
magnitudes and significance of variables increase over time, as they turn insignificant in the 
second sub-period. Stock market effects increase, both in size and significance over time, 
possibly related to the increased asset markets valuation, higher asset market volatility during the 
more recent period, and to increasing and more diversified asset ownership. Finally, the election 
cycle is more clearly evident in the more recent period.  
 
Cross-section panel estimates can be subject to some caveats. One could be heteroscedasticity, for 
which reason the full sample equation was re-estimated using White-heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance. Another risk in this type of estimations is cross-country 
correlations (e.g. an oil shock) and cross-time correlations (e.g. social-cultural features specific to 
one country). While OLS with country-specific intercepts and time-dummies, as employed so far 
in this study, may remove effects of these correlations in an ad hoc way, we also re-estimated 
 
Table 2 shows the full period results of these estimates.18
results reported previously for OLS (repeated in column 2) and the results using White’s 
estimations (column 3) are small, the main difference being  the effect of EMU entry turning 
somewhat smaller, from 0.8 to 0.6. The reverse happens when considering the results of SUR 
estimates. The size and significance of nearly all coefficients increases substantially in the SUR 
estimates, confirming that the included variables indeed affect changes in budget balances. It 
must be noted however, that the comparability of the outcome with previous results shown is 




                                                           
18 The sub-periods used before in the OLS estimates were too short for SUR re-estimation. 
19 SUR estimates in Eviews require balanced samples, reducing the number of observations by 20% on 
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 Generally, differences between the 
equations using SUR to provide a more elaborated way of dealing with them.  In a next estimation, house price changes were included. A practical drawback of including house 
prices is limited data-availability, both regarding the period covered and the countries included. 
Furthermore, definitions are not harmonised, measuring diverging house price concepts in various 
countries. Conclusions on this variable thus can only be made with more than usual caution. 
Inclusion of house price changes (one-year lagged) in the above equations produced small effects 
(0.02), significant at the 10% level only, as shown in the third column of table 3. Significance 
levels of other coefficients, however, decrease somewhat, notably for stock price increases, 
turning insignificant at the 10% level. The results again improve somewhat when using White-
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance, as shown in the table in the last 
column. Both stock prices and house prices are significant, at the 10% level.  
 
 
5.2 Results for EU countries 
 
As a next step, the sample of countries was restricted to the former 15 EU countries. One 
motivation for this is to see whether European fiscal attitudes differ from the others, as suggested 
by Viren (1998) for continental Europe. In addition, splitting the sample of countries provides 
insight in the sensitivity of the results described to the countries included. Table 4 shows the 
results for the entire time-span (1970-2002) and sub-periods using OLS, for the moment ignoring 
house prices. 
 
The results for the EU countries very much resemble those for our OECD sample, both regarding 
the size of the coefficients and the degree of their significance. While similarities dominate, a few 
small differences can be pointed at. Income elasticities in the EU appear to be slightly smaller 
than in the OECD sample in spite of the higher tax burden, possibly reflecting stronger (and 
longer) fine-tuning efforts by European governments. The stock market effect in the EU is 
marginally smaller, and is non-significant in the EU. The smaller effect may be attributed to 
smaller stock markets in the EU than in Anglo-Saxon countries outside the EU or less private 
ownership, causing smaller macroeconomic effects. On the other hand, the electoral cycle effect 
appears to be somewhat stronger in the EU (coefficient 0.41 instead of 0.34).  
 
As before for the OECD sample of countries, the entire period was split in two sub-periods, 1970-
1986 and 1987-2002. Comparing results for the second sub-period with the first one shows that 
the size and significance of coefficients increases with time. This applies in particular to the 




Working Paper Series No. 422
December 2004most recent sub-period. Finally, the electoral cycle effect intensifies over time in the EU, and is 
more pronounced than in the OECD sample. The only main exception to the improved results in 
the period 1987-2002 concerns interest rates, loosing their statistical significance.   
 
Next, we re-estimated the results using White-heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance and using SUR to cover cross-country and cross-time correlations. Results, as reported 
in table 5, reveal that using White’s estimation technique has no major impact on the outcomes, 
indicating some robustness of the results. SUR estimation results generally show higher 
significance levels of coefficients, with the coefficient values slightly increasing. This applies in 
particular to the election effect, increasing to 0.55% whereas the EMU effect increases to as much 
as 0.95%. As before with the results for the OECD sample, the improved outcomes could (partly) 
reflect the smaller number of observations used for SUR estimates.  
 
Finally, we also included lagged house price changes in the equation (table 6). Considering both 
the results from OLS (column 3) and from White’s estimation technique (column 4), house price 
increases in the EU may have some significance at the significance 10% level. The effect of 
changes in stock prices remains insignificant. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
Insight into the causes of changes in fiscal balances improves the understanding of the budgetary 
processes, and may help in selecting tools to avoid the occurrence of unsustainable large deficits 
and debts. In Europe, this is of particular importance given the EU fiscal framework aimed at 
avoiding excessive government deficits. 
 
Our analysis shows that fiscal outcomes are shaped by sustainability considerations (last year’s
change in the debt ratio), macroeconomic conditions, interest rates, the election cycle, EMU-entry
and asset price developments. The role of the initial budgetary conditions points to some self-
correcting mechanism, although rather weak. Macroeconomic growth affects budgets via automatic 
stabilisers. Discretionary fiscal policies, however, have been used more to stimulate economies in 
downswings than to restrict economic growth in upswings. Higher interest rates affect budgets 
negatively, as expected. Election years are clearly reflected in larger budget deficits. For the EU 
countries, approaching the decision-day on early EMU participation spurred fiscal consolidation, 
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always statistically significant. 
 
These results are fairly robust. Specific results to some extent depend on the estimation method 
used, the specification of variables, and on the time period covered. Generally, results improve in 
terms of significance the more recent the period that is considered. This applies in particular to 
budgetary effects of asset price variables. The main exception concerns interest rates, whose 
effects decline over time. Compared to the OECD sample, the estimation results for the EU 
countries generally show a lower income elasticity, lower stock price effects, and a stronger 
impact of the election cycle.  
 
Specifically with regard to the European countries, these findings imply that when setting safety 
margins below the 3% of GDP ceiling of the Maastricht Treaty, taking into account more factors 
than simply the cyclical sensitivity of budgets is a necessity. A mechanistic approach that ignores 
the other factors runs the risk of being surprised more often by the occurrence of excessive 
deficits. Elections affect budgetary orientations, and changes in stock and house market prices, 
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and sub-periods. 
  1970-2002 1970-1986 1987-2002 
























STOCK PRICE INCREASE (-1)   0.004  
(2.0)**   
 -0.001  
(0.3)  
















Adjusted R-squared  0.31 0.23 0.38 
D-W 1.99 2.12 2.07 
Nr of observations  713 361 352 
Fixed country-effects, time-dummies and country-specific dummies are not shown. 
** = significant at the 5% significance level, * = significant at the 10% significance level. 
 
 
Table 2. Determinants of changes in fiscal balances: results for 22 OECD countries, 1970-2002, 
alternative estimation technique. 
 OLS  White-heterosc. 
Consistent 
SUR 
























STOCK PRICE INCREASE (-1)   0.004  
(2.0)**   
 0.004  
(2.0)** 














Adjusted R-squared¶  0.31 0.36 0.81 
D-W¶ 1.99 1.96 2.03 
Nr of observations  713 713 572 
¶ For White-estimate and SUR weighted statistics. 
Fixed country-effects, time-dummies and country-specific dummies are not shown. 
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including house prices. 
 OLS  OLS  White-heterosc. 
Consistent  


















∆ L-T INTEREST RATE (-1)   -0.14  
(-2.6)**  
-0.20  
(-3.1)**   
-0.19  
(-3.4)**   
STOCK PRICE INCREASE (-1)   0.004  
(2.0)**   
0.004 















HOUSE PRICE INCREASE (-1)   0.02  
(1.9)* 
 0.02  
(1.9)* 
Adjusted R-squared  0.31 0.35 0.42¶ 
D-W 1.99 1.84 1.86¶ 
Nr of observations  713 539 539 
¶ For White-estimate weighted statistics. 
Fixed country-effects, time-dummies and country-specific dummies are not shown. 
** = significant at the 5% significance level, * = significant at the 10% significance level. 
 
Table 4. Determinants of changes in fiscal balances: results for 15 EU countries, 1970-2002 and 
sub-periods. 
 1970-2002  1970-1986  1987-2002 
∆ DEBT (-1)  0.03 
(2.1)**  
0.03  
(1.2)   
0.06  
(2.6)** 












∆ L-T INTEREST RATE (-1)   -0.13  
(-2.3)**  
-0.22  
(-2.4)**   
-0.04  
(-0.5)   
STOCK PRICE INCREASE (-1)   0.003  
(1.3)   
 -0.003  
(-0.8)  
 0.008  
(2.3)** 
ELEC -0.41 











Adjusted R-squared  0.32 0.21 0.41 
D-W 2.06 2.06 2.18 
Nr of observations  490 250 240 
Fixed country-effects, time-dummies and country-specific dummies are not shown. 
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alternative estimation technique. 
 OLS  White-heterosc. 
Consistent 
SUR 


















∆ L-T INTEREST RATE (-1)   -0.13  
(-2.3)**  
-0.15  
(-2.7)**   
-0.20  
(-4.4)**   
STOCK PRICE INCREASE (-1)   0.003  
(1.3)   
 0.003  
(1.5)    














Adjusted R-squared¶  0.32 0.36 0.36 
D-W¶  2.06 2.08 2.06 
Nr of observations  490 490 420 
¶ For White-estimate and SUR weighted statistics. 
Fixed country-effects, time-dummies and country-specific dummies are not shown. 
** = significant at the 5% significance level, * = significant at the 10% significance level. 
  
Table 6. Determinants of changes in fiscal balances: results for 12 EU countries, 1970-2002, 
including house prices. 
 OLS  OLS  White-heterosc. 
Consistent 


















∆ L-T INTEREST RATE (-1)   -0.13  
(-2.3)**  
-0.19  
(-2.5)**   
-0.17  
(-2.5)**   
STOCK PRICE INCREASE (-1)   0.003  
(1.3)   
 0.003  
(1.1)    
 0.004  
(1.5)    
ELEC -0.41 
(-2.8) **  
-0.41 
(-2.5) **  
-0.38 











Adjusted R-squared  0.32 0.40 0.44¶ 
D-W 2.06 2.05 2.04¶ 
Nr of observations  490 349 349 
¶ For White-estimate weighted statistics. 
Fixed country-effects, time-dummies and country-specific dummies are not shown. 
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Government deficit (BUDGET) 
General government net borrowing / net lending as % of GDP. Data have been corrected for one-
off UMTS receipts, which played a role particularly around the turn of the century. 
Source: the European Commission Ameco, the OECD Economic Outlook and the IMF World 
Economic Outlook databases. 
 
Government debt (DEBT) 
General government gross debt as % of GDP 
Source: the European Commission Ameco, the OECD Economic Outlook and the IMF World 
Economic Outlook databases. 
 
Long-term nominal interest rates 
Source: the OECD Economic Outlook, the IMF World Economic Outlook and the Global 
Financial databases. 
 
Short-term nominal interest rates 




Source: the OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
Real GDP growth 
Source: the OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
GDP gap  
Difference between actual and trend real GDP, as a percentage of the latter. Trend GDP is 
estimated using a HP-filter on real GDP, with lambda value of 100. 
 
Inflation rate 
Consumer price index 
Source: the OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
House prices 
Changes in nominal prices of existing and new dwellings. With few exceptions, data series are 
not available for longer time periods. To arrive at sufficiently long data-series, we linked series 
that were somewhat comparable if available. Data are non-harmonised, making cross-country 
comparisons rather difficult. Some national series reflect overall indices of house price 
conditions, while others however only pertain to specific dwellings or to specific geographical 
areas. No series are available for Austria, Portugal, and for New Zealand, and data are also 




Source: the Global Financial database. 
 
Real GDP per capita 
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Dummy with value 1 in years in which parliamentary elections have taken place (France and the 
US: presidential elections). Years in which no democratic general elections were possible (Spain, 
Portugal and Greece in the 1970s) have been given value 0. 
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral assistance (www.idea.int). 
 
Government type 
Type of government, ranging from 1 (single party government) to 6 (temporary caretaker 
government). A single party government is believed to be more decisive than multiparty majority 
governments, let alone minority governments and caretakers, reducing the need for higher deficits 
as “grease” for the coalition. 
Source: Armingeon et.al (2002). 
 
Government party 
Political orientation of government cabinet, ranging from 1 (no social-democratic and other left 
parties in cabinet posts) to 5 (hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties in the 
government cabinet). 
Source: Armingeon et.al (2002). 
 
Number of political parties 
This variable measures the effective number of parties in parliament, provided it received more 
than 2% of the votes in the election. A high number of parties indicates the need for coalition 
governments, increasing the likelihood of high budget deficits. 
Source: Armingeon et.al (2002). 
 
Fiscal Governance  
Three separate dummies, reflecting Commitment, Delegation or Mixed fiscal governance were 
based on the categorisation included in Hallerberg (2004), covering the EU Member States for the 
period 1973-2002. 
Source: Hallerberg (2004). 
 
Political Stability 
The political stability index measures how likely policies are to change on the basis of the number 
of veto points in a country’s political system. A high value indicates that the political system in 
the country faces many constraints, reducing the likelihood of major changes. 
Source: Henisz (2002). 
 
EMU-dummy (EMU) 
Dummy taking value 1 in 1994-1998 in the EU Member States, 0 otherwise. 
 
GDP gap dummy (GAP) 
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This annex shows the main results of unit root tests on the dependent and the main independent 
variables for the period 1970-2002 for our 22 OECD countries, as far as data are available. 
Testing focussed on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for panels as included in Eviews. For the 
variables that were included in our favoured regressions, the test statistics are included in the 
table below. The outcomes reveal that the assumption of unit roots can be safely rejected at high 
significance levels.  
 
Table A2.1 ADF-test results for 22 OECD countries, 1970-2002 
Variable 
∆ Government deficit (% GDP)  365.2*** 
∆ Government debt (% GDP)  160.7*** 
Real GDP growth  272.2*** 
Growth of stock prices  403.7*** 
Growth of house prices  128.3*** 
∆ Long-term interest rate  304.1*** 
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